Independent technical-legal proposal
I5TRUST-DRAFT-00 — Anti-Squatting and Anti-Phishing
Anti-squatting, anti-phishing and plural reputation model.
I5TRUST-DRAFT-00 — Anti-Squatting and Anti-Phishing
This is an independent draft, not an official IETF RFC.
Internet 5.0 Initiative A. F. Rodrigues
Request for Comments: I5TRUST-DRAFT-00 Independent
Category: Informational 27 May 2026
Anti-Squatting, Anti-Phishing and Plural Reputation Model
for the Internet 5.0 Naming System
Status of This Memo
This document is an independent informational draft inspired by the
Request for Comments format. It is NOT an official IETF RFC. Its purpose is
to propose anti-abuse mechanisms for I5NS without creating a central
censorship authority.
Abstract
This document defines principles to reduce name squatting, typosquatting,
Unicode homograph attacks, phishing, brand impersonation, compromised keys
and suspicious locator changes in I5NS while preserving decentralization,
plural reputation, contestability and absence of backdoors.
1. Core Principle
Human-readable names are convenience aliases, not absolute property. The
canonical root of trust is the cryptographic identity, accompanied by
historical use, signed records, verifiable proofs and plural reputation.
2. Anti-Squatting
I5TRUST-REQ-01: The system MUST NOT recognize absolute, perpetual and
commercially alienable property over human-readable names as a protocol
requirement.
I5TRUST-REQ-02: Clients and reputation lists MAY downgrade names without
proven use, without active content, without proof of control, without
signing history or with evidence of speculative registration.
I5TRUST-REQ-03: Transfer of a human-readable name MUST NOT automatically
transfer reputation, history, trust or previous verifications.
I5TRUST-REQ-04: Reputation SHOULD follow cryptographic identity and
historical use, not merely the human-readable string.
3. Anti-Phishing
I5TRUST-REQ-05: I5NS clients SHOULD detect visually confusable names,
Unicode homograph attacks, character substitution, typosquatting and
impersonation of brands or recognized identities.
I5TRUST-REQ-06: I5NS clients SHOULD display stronger warnings when a new,
low-reputation name is visually similar to a verified name, financial
institution, public service, health service, critical platform or high-risk
identity.
I5TRUST-REQ-07: Sudden locator changes in high-reputation identities SHOULD
trigger warnings and require additional verification.
4. Reputation Lists
Reputation lists MUST be plural, signed, auditable, voluntary and
contestable. No reputation list MUST be mandatory at the protocol level.
Suggested types: Trust List, Warning List, Fraud List, Phishing List,
Compromised Key List and Dispute List.
5. User Display
Clients SHOULD display signals such as verified, recognized source,
unverified source, disputed name, visually similar to known source,
identity reported for phishing, compromised key and high risk.
6. Anti-Censorship Limits
Anti-abuse mechanisms MUST NOT create a central censorship authority,
global kill switch, backdoor, mandatory censorship list or mandatory civil
identity registry.